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3 these places are specifically mobile'. 13 Recognition and appreciation of the mobility or fluidity of ocean space unsettle our understanding of geopolitics, and help us appreciate that order is 'dynamic and continually reconstituted'. 14 This understanding is Steinberg's 'ocean ontology', 15 an understanding of the essential fluidity of the geo-political world. Land also moves and changes, but this is more readily understood at sea. For my argument the sea offers both the construction of space as flat and empty and the challenge to that construction, this is the process of striation and smoothing.
In this article I will use the concepts of smooth and striated to consider the organisation of space in international law, particularly ocean space. The law makes these abstract lines of territory have material effects. When the physical world fails to live up to law's certainty, then serious violence can be done, whether it is the historical dispossession of a native population or the contemporary European refugee crisis. It is at sea that international law has developed many of its spatial elements. The sea has been understood as flat, empty and featureless, and this understanding has influenced the way international law constructs space more generally.
In the first part of this article I set out to understand the sea. I do this primarily through attention to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Elden, and Steinberg. I am drawing on geography to explain the construction of ocean space in international law. 16 Recent scholarship and recent events have highlighted the relevance these two disciplines have for each other. Daniel Bethlehem has drawn attention to the ways that processes of globalisation and the rise of international non-state actors have reduced the significance of 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid 273. 15 Steinberg & Peters (2015) . 16 the state in international law. 17 At the same time the European refugee crisis, a crisis of the sea and a crisis of states, has seen the reinforcement and fortification of sovereign borders. 18 It is timely to understand that the sea has always been constructed in this
conflicting way, open and closed, free and controlled. Our attention must be on for whom the sea is free, the border open, and who the law historically shuts out, subjugates and excludes.
I will then apply this geographic thought to the history of international law of the sea. The sea has been progressively striated, whilst always susceptible to becoming smooth once more. This conflict can be seen from two key moments in early modern international law:
the Treaty of Tordesillas and Hugo Grotius' Mare Liberum. I put these texts in context, and examine the relationship between law and geography in this period, and the operation of Of course Bethlehem is not making a novel claim. It is worth instead noting the claim being made by such an eminent scholar in such a renowned journal. 18 Hani Sayed captured this beautifully with his description of "exodus when the seas don't part" at TWAIL Cairo 2015.
5 point for how international lawyers have understood the sea. In Nomos Schmitt argues that 'the spatial ordering of the earth in terms of international law' emerged as a wholly new problem at the end of the 15 th century with European discovery of the new world and then the circumnavigation of the globe. 19 Schmitt also emphasises Tordesillas, and the accompanying advances in the technology of navigation and measurement, as leading to a 'global linear thinking', that as soon as the globe could be comprehended as a whole, it had to be divided. 20 Schmitt outlines the ways in which international law and political theory at this time provided a basis for a new appreciation of the spatial ordering of the globe. These developments of course happen at sea.
Schmitt considered the importance of the sea to be its difference from the land. Not just the basic physical differences, but the different way that the sea is subjected to law, order and control. The land can be directly invested in to produce value; it is visibly transformed by work upon it and it can be physically demarcated and enclosed. 21 The sea, however, shares For Allott, UNCLOS is 'the product of a total international social process extending back, philosophically and historically, to the sixteenth century and far beyond'. 37 Whilst for the most part the treaty is 'an actualisation of well-known conceptual structures', the variety of lines of demarcation and jurisdictional zones, it also 'contains within itself the potential negations of those structures and hence the potentiality of a structurally new law of the sea'. 38 These potential negations are found in part XI, on the international seabed and in part V, where the exclusive economic zone envisages 'a system of social management'.
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UNCLOS also contains a general concern for social objectives, particularly the environment, and ultimately 'when the Convention is seen as a whole, its Gestalt seems to be much more that of a public law system than that of a contractual arrangement'. 40 For Allott, UNCLOS recognises that the space of the sea is never simply a question of one state's rights in relation to another. The sea is the space where the international community ceases to be an abstract idea and becomes real, in the interplay of the variety of different rights and duties which exist in the ocean space.
Allott's thoughts are not as abstract and idealised as they may seem. Despite the failure of ideas such as the Enterprise to actually come into existence, the idea of a community interest in the sea has taken hold. Looking at the contents page of a recent textbook on the law of the sea shows that the subject can be doctrinally allocated between 'Divided Oceans', the question of jurisdiction, and 'Common Oceans', the question of community interests.
41
This is more than an echo of Allott's distinction between the 'property approach' and the 'government approach'.
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A couple of less optimistic points in response to Allott must also be made. Firstly, the EEZ can be seen as an extension of territorialisation of the seas, an increase in the reach of 44 Part XI deserves even more scrutiny. This part of UNCLOS covers the international sea bed, and Allott's hope is drawn from the designation of this area as 'the common heritage of mankind'. 45 The main resource on the deep sea bed are manganese nodules. This principle, of a resource belonging to all, and to be exploited for the benefit of all, was revolutionary. It was a key part of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), and of the Third World Movement more generally. 46 The First World opposed these developments as against the fundamental need for competition in production under capitalism. These states, led by the United States,
proposed that the International Seabed Authority should license the mining of these resources, distributing tax revenues to less developed nations. 47 However, it remains remarkable that these negotiations happened at all, and demonstrates the importance of securing the rest of UNCLOS for these states. As it turned out, the global recession of the 1970s, and increasing understanding of the practical difficulties in mining the deep sea bed, meant that much of this became irrelevant. Agreements reached in the UNCLOS conferences in the early 1970s were all but forgotten in the 1980s. By the 1990s and the Implementation Agreement, 48 with the end of the Cold war, the end of the NIEO, and the triumph of neoliberalism, Part XI was no longer important. This spirit of cooperation and development was long over. The agreement introduced free market principles over the deep sea bed, and left the principle of common heritage an empty shell. 49 The Enterprise, which would mine the deep seabed, exists only on paper.
On the question of the deep sea bed, international law ultimately constructed this space as empty and featureless once again, but it flirted with an alternative. interdependent. This is a relationship of simultaneity, not of dialectics; they are related as a form of translation. The intense magnitude of the smooth can be the infinite distance of the striated. So the sea, because it is such a perfectly smooth space, always demands striation, from nomadic navigation based on 'wind and noise' to complex maps with longitude and latitude. 50 The sea is the first space that was striated, and this model was taken and applied to other smooth spaces. But, striated spaces constantly produce new smooth spaces as well.
The city, which is the archetypal striated space, produces smooth spaces, either in shanty towns which leak out of the edges, or simply in the movement of people through the city 'as a nomad'. 57 This will always lead to a reterritorialization, power has to be located, it has to be territorialized.
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The migrant or refugee seeks a reterritorialization, either in a return to a changed place or the finding of a new place.
This process of line drawing, or striation and the inevitable smoothing, also happens at a smaller scale than the state. In Foucauldian terms, it is an aspect of micro power, the striation of the body. In particular this is how Deleuze reads Foucault's Discipline and Punish, as a piece of radical cartography, understanding the lines that are drawn by panopticism, by discipline as a social technology pre-existing the actual institutions. 59 Deleuze describes this social technology as a diagram. 60 Technology is social before it is material, so the need to 55 Ibid 500. The sea provides a provocative change of perspective on how international law orders space, and that this ordering has effects all the way down to individuals. However, the observations so far are in danger of becoming too abstract. The physical geography of the ocean can also add something to this analysis.
The Sea in Practice -Constructing the Ocean Differently
Steinberg reads Deleuze and Guattari's idea of the smooth ocean as reduceing the sea to merely a symbol, an idealised 'signifier for a world of shifting, fragmented identities, mobilities and connections'. 62 This 'over-theorising' ignores the 'actual lives of individuals who experience and interact with the sea on a regular, or even occasional, basis'. 63 The first step towards reasserting the physical reality of the ocean, to 'getting wet', is to recognise 'the actual work of construction ... that transpires to make a space what it is'. 64 Actual experiences of the sea must be considered, particularly, but not only, human experiences.
'Life at sea' cannot be reduced to merely 'life on ship'. 65 Nonetheless, this perspective is a productive starting point when thinking about international law. The 'more than human' elements of the sea need also to be understood, specifically its liquid nature, 'as emergent with, and not merely an underlying context for, human activities'.
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The 'rethinking' which Steinberg advocates has three main steps: observing the ocean and its movement, thinking about how this movement changes our idea of ocean regions and boundaries, and rethinking the binary between land and sea. Essentially this process takes the 'empty' ocean of Schmitt, or the 'smooth' ocean of Deleuze and Guattari, and fills it in again, with the physical properties of the sea. Rethinking the ocean as a moving space starts from physical geography, and two different schools of oceanography: Eulerian and 12
Lagrangian. 67 Eulerian oceanographers measure the forces acting on stable buoys. This 'mimics the terrestrial spatial ontology wherein points are fixed in space and mobile forces are external to and act on those points'. 68 Steinberg's preference is for Lagrangian modelling, which instead maps the movement of "floaters" in three-dimensional space.
From this perspective 'movement, instead of being subsequent to geography, is
This thinking is particularly responsive to Deleuze and Guattari's idea of the smooth and striated ocean. In striated spaces 'the line is between two points', whereas in the smooth, 'the point is between two lines'. 70 Similarly, the Eulerian perspective sees the sea as a line between two points, with Steinberg suggesting the line between London and New York. The second step, 'rethinking the region', is particularly relevant for the law of the sea. This is questioning the basis on which we demarcate regions at sea, again by emphasising that the sea moves. Obviously, this parallels a major shared concern of geographers and international lawyers on land, the question of where to draw a boarder, why and how, can be endlessly debated. This question at sea though takes on a particular importance because it is, remembering Schmitt's similar observation, so difficult to physically mark space at sea.
This means that any lines we draw in the ocean 'speak not with the authority of a geophysicality that cannot be fully grasped but with the authority of a juridical system that conceivably can'. 73 This throws into sharp relief the conflicting nature of the certainty of law's abstract enunciation and the uncertainty of the world.
This opposition between line drawing's, and therefore law's, fictional stability, and the ocean's physical and real fluidity, should direct us to consider mobility again. This conflict is 67 Ibid 160. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Deleuze & Guattari (1987) 480. 71 Steinberg (2013) 160. 72 Ibid 161. 73 Ibid 162.
13 present wherever law and space interact, with the law controlling and ordering the use of space. The law, particularly international law of the sea, can be too often reduced to what is permitted and prohibited in certain spaces. To emphasise fluidity is to emphasis social practices and institutions, and ultimately movement, action or process rather than location.
The final step is in 'rethinking land-sea binaries'. 74 This is to recognise that the world is not neatly split into 'land and water'. 75 This binary produces an understanding of the land as the place where 'society' exists, whereas the sea is simply a zone of exchange. 76 It can be broken down in geography by the study of areas which do not easily fit into either camp, such as swamps, islands or sea ice. This binary is not just a bias of geography, but is also very apparent in international law and international politics more generally. The inside, of land, states and territories, is opposed to the outside of the external seas. This is also a basis for ideas of inviolable sovereignty on the land, on the inside. It is also part of Schmitt's interest in the sea, as this external/internal divide gives a geographic and physical counterpart to the idea of spaces of exception. 77 This opposition is why Allott found the law of the sea so promising; the sea is easily conceptualised as beyond state control, and so does not face the problem of overcoming sovereignty when asserting community interests. The sea has been and to some extent continues to be a space without sovereignty. To take that lesson back onto dry land would be a move at unsettling this binary. 78 The featureless ocean between places, something which is only to be crossed, is what Steinberg seeks ultimately to oppose:
This representation serves modernity well, as it reproduces the idea that the world consists of, on the one hand, static terrestrial points on the "inside" that may be settled, developed, and grouped into states and, on the other hand, aqueous points on the "outside" that, due to the absence of properties that enable settlement and territorialisation, may be written off as beyond society. 79 14 This is also a feature of international law, when it only concerns itself with the relations of states. However, the inside/outside distinction is more widespread, particularly when international law is seen as 'outside' the state, and so nothing to do with the society which exists 'inside'. International law wears this mask of being outside the state, but very obviously has effects on the inside, most obviously when we think of trade as Grotius did.
Striated and smooth, space and place, empty and full, territory and landscape. In Deleuzian terms, the concept of the smooth and striated is nomadic. 80 It is also a diagram, that is it displays the relations between forces. 81 The law is an abstract machine which imposes concrete assemblages, that is the law makes a line on a map have the power to allocate resources, determine identity, and tell us who gets to be a citizen and who a refugee.
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Abstract spatial ideas are given their certainty and brutal reality through international law.
The European refugee crisis gives us a very contemporary example of the violence which arises from lines drawn in empty spaces.
The ocean as a place
If we can understand the physical reality of the seas, we can start to understand the sea as a place, rather than as a space. 83 This distinction is a complex and contested concept in cultural geography, and my application of it here is unavoidably quite crude. For my purposes, space is abstract and absolute, whereas place is constructed through social practices such as naming, gathering and interacting. This distinction between space and place can also help examine how international law shapes space, and the people within it. It is not just people that make a place, as Bruno Latour has argued, 'objects too have agency'. 84 Those objects at sea which seem most obvious are ships and fish, but the sea 80 15 itself must be kept in mind, and its movement. To attempt to understand this I draw on two pieces of literature in which the sea is a place.
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The sea, and particularly life on, in and next to the sea, are subjects of careful meditation in
Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea. 86 The old man talks to the sea, it is a definite character within the story. When the man sails out and sets his lines, he does so with an appreciation of the different depths of the sea, and what happens at each level. The fish near the surface help him, such as those he eats to sustain him, and his principle friends are flying fish. The birds in the sky guide him to good fishing areas, and also provide company when they land on his boat, which in turn allows them to rest far out at sea. The marlin which he catches is a character who the man talks with, competes with and is literally joined with. When the sharks come and eat the marlin, the man apologises to the fish for failing it, for taking its life without any gain. He himself is destroyed when the fish is destroyed.
Nature participates actively in this story, and the sea is not simply personified, it is a place.
But it is not, and cannot be, a place like a place on land. The sea moves. Movement constitutes the ocean space, and so to turn it into a place is to move with it. Santiago, the old man in Hemingway's novel, moves with the sea. He moves out beyond not just the sight of the land but beyond the smell of the land, to try and improve his luck. He goes past different places, past the Gulf weed, past the wells, past the great well, to the place where the schools of albacore are. These are definite places in the novel, some denoted by the underwater features, some by what is near the surface. When he hooks the marlin, he travels with it for three days, going where it goes, never truly fearing that he won't find his way back again. When he has caught the marlin, he is able to sail back by the feel of the wind. The old man is entirely at home at sea, understands its depths, and produces a genuine sense of place.
A second example of the sea as a place in literature, which also gives a subaltern perspective, can be found in the work of the poet Derek Walcott. Lots of Walcott's poetry 85 In turning to literature I am influenced by Richard Weisberg's poethics, and in particular inspired by the idea that we can use literature to access experiences of the world different to our own. I cannot become an oceanographer or live as a fisherman, but I can read, and respond with both thought and emotion. 86 Having complicated the possible understandings of ocean space, and space under international law more generally, in the second half of this article I now turn to the ways that international law has regulated the sea, and ultimately focusing on the contemporary crisis of the sea, and the most pressing political problem of today, the refugee crisis. Elden states that Tordesillas was a 'break with the idea that simply occupation led to possession', and the start of dividing land(s) by calculative measures. 106 The line actually preceded the ability to measure this precise longitude. The techniques required to make such claims were developed and improved in this period, precisely for the purpose of establishing where this line was. The process of map making and line drawing led the process of boundary marking, and these lines had to be translated onto the ground. 107 As
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT SEA
Matthew Edney has put it, 'Empire is a cartographic construction', 108 the making of maps and the making of empires happen together. Advances in navigation and geometry were needed to produce the best claim to these lands. The claim of territory quickly developed from being based in discovery or occupation, to being based in scientific calculation.
Steinberg emphasises that the Treaty did not grant, and was not understood as granting, territory over the sea. Grotius and others would oppose this idea as a straw man. The treaty actually divided the sea into different zones for the exercise of power. 109 The nature of the sea was ignored. It was simply understood as something to be travelled over to reach resources. Lines were drawn as if the space was entirely empty, and maps from this period 20 do exactly the same. 110 This line has no meaning in terms of control of the sea, and has no effect on the ocean itself, its meaning arises from the social practices around it. At its enunciation, it simply declared that the Spanish and the Portuguese should travel in different directions whilst searching for new lands.
The legal historian Lauren Benton emphasises that Tordesillas did not grant sovereignty.
111
The spheres of influence given in the treaty and associated bulls actually opened up the seas for inter-imperial competition. The technical difficulty of finding the lines meant that it could never operate to divide the world, but actually operated to increase the competition between the two Kingdoms over title to different lands. Sovereignty would only be achieved over newly discovered lands if accompanied with other supporting proof, such as mapping, the founding of communities, and administrative actions supporting discovery. The treaty of Tordesillas in historical focus appears as a perfect example of the striation which Deleuze and Guattari wrote about, as well as demonstrating the diagrammatic function of this line as social before it is technical. The line was an attempt to order and control this space, but partly due to the physical environment and partly due to the nature of inter-imperial competition, this did not happen. Thus the sea is clearly subjected to formal striation, which is then smoothed once more. This line did not decide territorial claims; it merely indicated two spheres of influence. But its meaning was reconstructed as the situation changed. In the 16 th century both Portugal and Spain began to claim that the line should go around the globe, giving their party control of the Spice Islands, depending on how the line was drawn. 113 The line in the sea was quickly applied to the land, most obviously in the north east corner of South America which roughly makes up modern day Brazil, where it had instant and important effects. This line was treated as a very real and meaningful one when Grotius began his legal argument over a century later.
21

Mare Liberum and International Courts of the Sea
Mare Liberum was a revised chapter from Grotius' unpublished De Jure Praedae (DJP), published at the request of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) directors to 'have the right of navigation -which is competent to the Dutch nation over the whole wide worldthoroughly examined and adduced with rational as well as legal arguments'. 114 The purpose The ship was confiscated by the Amsterdam Admiralty Court on 4 th September 1604, and declared a good prize on the 9 th September. Hugo Grotius was approached by the directors of the DEIC to write a defence of the seizure of this ship, which became DJP. 118 In arguing this case, Grotius was provided with copious materials, in particular van Heemskerck's 22 correspondence and a collection of Dutch sailors' testaments against the actions of the Portuguese in the East Indies. 119 The argument in DJP is focused on demonstrating that the Portuguese, in attempting to control trade in the East Indies, were violating natural law. As a result van Heemskerk, who did not have a privateering commission, was justified in taking this prize as compensation for this wrong. Under natural law, Grotius argued, a private individual could punish another for a breach of this law.
The content of Mare Liberum has been often examined, 120 here I want to focus on it as an example of international law coming from the sea. It is worth emphasising that DJP was written to support the decision of an admiralty court to award a ship as a good prize. Hugo
Grotius, like Gentili before him, was engaging with the practice of international law in the admiralty courts. 121 Admiralty courts at this time were an early forum for the development of international law in practice. Arguably, the courts were self-aware that this is what they control. 123 The authority of admiralty courts and privateering letters of marque, joined with the authority of maps and navigational techniques, allowed European states to project their 23 authority into these ocean spaces in specific ways. Merchants, privateers and pirates all followed this system to some extent. Merchants were restricted to certain routes of navigation, and certain ports where they could trade. Privateers needed commissions from states authorising them to plunder other ships. Even pirates, the great symbol of freedom outside the law, in reality followed this system, attempting to operate at the very edges of legitimacy and blur the lines between pirate and privateer. The pirate in Benton's account is actually so deeply engaged with the law and legal argument as to be fairly described as a 'lawyer at sea '. 124 This interplay of different legal ideas and regimes all overlapping at sea, a sea very much covered by law, can actually be found in DJP, as opposed to Mare Liberum with its focus on freedom for navigation. Grotius started with natural law and a unique claim, that 'it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the State'. 125 Grotius starts from a natural right of individuals to judge and punish which was transferred to the sovereign authority. 25 universal jurisdiction over pirates. In particular, it is the pirate's position on the sea which is important, as the sea is the smooth conduit between nations, which the pirate threatens. It is the ocean's smoothness which creates the pirate, and the striating of universal jurisdiction.
As the English turned against pirates in the 18 th century, the law of prizes became, in
Benton's words, 'an early example of global administrative law', setting rules for trade, travel and jurisdiction. 133 The admiralty courts created a network of international law covering the oceans. Politically, freedom of the seas remained an important doctrine, but legal practice in these courts understood the sea as covered with different sorts of jurisdiction. Legal arguments about the law of the sea and international law were bound up with privateering, merchant imperialism, and piracy. The idea of rights of jurisdiction separate to actual ownership, a divisible form of sovereignty, was developed specifically in the context of the sea, and then deployed to devastating effect on land by colonial empires. 
UNCLOS
The 20 th century gave us UNCLOS, a treaty intended to 'settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea'. 137 In terms of spatial issues, UNCLOS establishes several different maritime zones. The first is the territorial sea, which extends sovereignty for 12 nautical miles (nm) off the shore of a coastal state. 138 As a result the area becomes territory, in Elden's sense, as a bounded space under the control of a people. But its 'boundedness' remains largely hypothetical, since the actual material of the sea moves, and literally cannot be bounded. The control is becoming more concrete, in certain states, with sophisticated navigation and military technologies, but the practice of recognising every coastal state as having this 'territory' precedes any being able to clearly define and control it.
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The next zone is the contiguous zone. 140 This is a further 12nm of sea over which a state can exercise limited sovereignty, specifically for customs, immigration, and sanitary regulation. 
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This process of gradation exactly matches the striation process outlined from the start. The sea under UNCLOS is divided up in a way which can never have physical reality due to the sea's materiality, the fact that it moves constantly. Even the shelf, which is an extension of the land, is defined partly by reference to the sea. Claims to a continental shelf also do not The measurement of all these zones is a fiction of the law developed on the basis of understanding the sea as a blank canvas. While sophisticated satellite navigation may be able to pin point the different zones, they still exist only on maps. Furthermore, even with exact measuring, the question of where you measure from is unsettled. The starting point is the low water line, 147 but this is very hard to define precisely, and a range of different definitions can be adopted. 148 The practice of baseline drawing for complicated coasts, bays, and islands, and the encircling of archipelagos to call some sea 'internal', takes us back to nothing more than line drawing on empty, featureless ocean. The law continues to treat the sea as an abstract entity, certainly when it comes to these questions of sovereignty, territory and jurisdiction. The sea is not free for those fleeing. The chapter VII UNSC resolution allowing for the use of force was the response of Europe and the international community to unprecedented numbers of people drowning in the Mediterranean, and in particular to the image of Aylan
Kurdi. The law opens and closes these doors, it makes the sea free and flat for trade and exchange, but rough and closed for people.
People at Sea
The refugee at sea is not a new phenomenon, but the problem of the refugee at sea, of where they are to go, is a particular problem of modernity. The territorial line, first drawn on the sea and then taken on to the land, the violence of this line has driven people from one home and shut them out of any potential new one.
158 M Foucault, 'Interview with H Uno' Dits et écrits III 798 (271) 798-800, translated by Ryóji Nakamura. Translated from the French by Colin Gordon, 2015 for openDemocracy, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/michel-foucault/refugee-problem-is-presage-of-great-migrations-of-twentyfirst-century (last accessed 11 January 2016). 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 As quoted in F Webber, Borderline Justice (Pluto Press, 2012) 4.
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The refugee captures this problem I have been exploring here. It is the person who is excluded by law, placed on the other side of a line, striated into illegality. 163 As Catherine
Dauvergne argues, refugee law is about crisis, it operates in a paradigm of crisis, not resolution. 164 The refugee only exists in crisis, obviously, but this logic structures the whole regime of refugee law. The refugee camp is the crisis alternative to politically impossible resettlement or repatriation. The refugee camp is a temporary response to a crisis, no matter that some camps have now lasted years. 165 The boat of refugees arriving on shore is also a crisis image, played on TV news under frightening headlines. Dauvergne also argues that refugees breach western sovereignty in that refugee law imposes obligations on the state where they arrive. 166 For states in the Global South which boarder 'refugee producing nations', their sovereignty is obliterated by the arrival of tens of thousands who cannot be turned away. 167 In this way the refugee regime is a proxy measure of sovereignty. We need only compare the response to the refugee crisis in the UK, which settled accepted 1,000 refugees in 2015, and Lebanon, where over 1 million Syrians are refugees, 1 in 5 people in the country. 168 The crisis of refugees looks very different depending on what sort of state the refugee arrives in.
It is also in refugee law where we find the individual in international law, far more so than in human rights law. Dauvergne highlights that the text of the refugee conventions is the most interpreted and applied text in international law, reinterpreted and reapplied in every individual asylum claim. 169 There were 1.66 million asylum applications in 2014. 170 Refugee law imposes duties on states, in terms of receiving, protecting, resettling, that are not held back by issues of responsibility, jurisdiction etc. The refugee is an international person, unhinged from a state by circumstance.
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A final important point made by Dauvergne is that, contra Agamben, the refugee and the refugee camp are not outside politics, as Homo Sacer is. The analogy of the refugee camp and the concentration camp is powerful and meaningful, but they separate here as the refugee is at the heart of 21 st century law and politics. Agamben's work does have use here when we consider the failed asylum seeker, a figure truly located outside of law and politics, in a negative space of bare life. The refugee challenges the state, it is an individual challenge against states more fundamental than any human right, it is simply a claim that life has value.
Returning again to Deleuze and Guattari, they explain that the refugee is not a nomad. 171 To flee is not nomadic. Refugees have had their very bodies striated, being from somewhere, labelled and outside. The war machine makes space smooth again, 'but, in the strangest of reversals, it is for the purpose of controlling striated space more completely'. 172 Aerial bombing then, and drone warfare, 173 have dominated and controlled the places fled from. 21 st century capitalism also functions with the logic of the war machine. The refugees are then met with an enhanced striation of border fences and militarily patrolled seas. As they say, 'the smooth itself can be drawn and occupied by diabolical powers of organisation'. 174 It is the organisation of the physical world through law which produces the migrant, the refugee, the need for them to flee, and their death in the sea.
The pirate is quite possibly the figure who connects the clearly intertwined history of imperialism, capitalism and international law. 175 As Gerry Simpson has compellingly argued, the pirate may well be the modern 'defining motif' of international law, its 'foundational bête noir'. 176 Piracy is the first international crime, and the first offence to give rise to universal jurisdiction. 177 It is also the existence of this enemy which creates the international community to wage war against it, the international community which is also responsible for refugees. 178 The enemies of mankind create mankind, and vice versa, another simultaneity fitting with the process of smoothing and striating.
Piracy offers one potential more positive view of people at sea. If the sea is the smooth space par excellence, then pirates may be the archetypal nomads. The pirate constructed or constructs the social space of the ocean differently. In Benton's account the pirate is a lawyer, but Marcus Rediker depicts the seaman generally, and the pirate particularly, very differently, as a mobile culture and community. 179 It does not do much violence to the anthropological meaning of the term to name pirates as nomads. As a people who come 'from the sea', 180 from a mobile space, characterised by movement. Rediker argues that the egalitarian politics of seafarers arose from their nomadism, and that egalitarian social organisation is inherent to nomadic ways of life. 181 This leads us back from people to place, via Deleuze and Guattari. They argue that 'nomads have no history, only geography'.
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Nomads exist on smooth space, and the pirate and the sea are nomads on smooth space.
The potential of this smooth space is that 'a heterogeneous smooth space is wedded to a very particular type of multiplicity: non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities which occupy space without counting it'. 183 Or, as Kuhn paraphrases, the smooth space allows for 'self-determined, creative "free" forms of life'. 184 It is ridiculous to try and celebrate the refugee camp as a potential egalitarian space, and yet moments like the camp on the rocks at Ventimiglia 185 on the Italy-France border offer a glimpse of how this unparalleled movement of people must fundamentally challenge the reproduction of life in Europe. At the same time, privately run refugee camps produce profit
